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An International Organization’s Identity Crisis 
 
By Sungjoon Cho* 
 
Abstract: The ontological status of international organizations remains largely 
nebulous despite their contemporary prominence.  Traditional international relations 
theories regard international organizations (IOs) as instruments primarily created to 
serve powerful states’ interests (neorealism) or to facilitate interstate cooperation on 
certain regulatory areas (neoliberal institutionalism).  These theories hardly offer a 
satisfactory explanation of a distinctive mode of IOs’ identity forming process, in 
which a particular IO, as a separate and autonomous organic entity, grows, evolves 
and eventually makes sense of its own existence.  This Article offers a novel 
perspective that attempts to overcome the aforementioned theoretical deficiency.  
Drawing on the identity theory in psychology, this new perspective captures an IO’s 
internal normative development in which one can witness a dynamic process of 
identity formation.  The Article argues that based on its autonomy sine qua non 
organization, and not merely as an instrument of states, an IO forms its unique legal 
identity as it experiences a normative crisis in a similar way that a human individual 
would.  An IO discovers its genuine identity only after it achieves a necessary level of 
institutional maturity as a result of incessant legal interactions and communications 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
 
International organizations (IOs) are ubiquitous.  More than two 
hundred IOs1 touch our everyday lives.  Their missions vary.  The United 
Nations (UN) plays a significant role in securing global peace and order as 
 
1 See, e.g., UNION OF INT’L ASS’NS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, App. 3: 
Table 1 (2005/2006), available at http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf.  When I 
use “international organizations” in this article, I mean “intergovernmental organizations.” 
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it addresses international conflicts and fights terrorism.2  The World Bank 
is the world’s largest external funder of education.3  Other IOs also impact 
numerous diurnal issues, such as air travel (International Civil Aviation 
Organization), 4  banking (Bank for International Settlements), 5  mail 
(Universal Postal Union),6 flu shots (World Health Organization),7 and 
mobile phones (International Telecommunication Union),8 to name a few.9  
IOs now pertain to nearly every aspect of practical human enterprise.10 
Notwithstanding their contemporary prominence, IOs’ real nature 
remains contentious.  What is an IO?  Is it simply an instrument of 
powerful states?  If so, would it be worthwhile to study an IO on its own 
terms?  How on do we perceive and investigate an IO? 
Conventional international relations (IR) theories, such as 
neorealism 11  or neoliberal institutionalism, 12  often collectively labeled 
“rationalism,” 13  consider IOs passive machines. 14   According to these 
 
2 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc S/RES/1822 (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/ 
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1822 (resolving to freeze financial assets used for terrorist 
activities). 
3 Ten Things That You Never Knew About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://digitalmedia. 
worldbank.org/tenthings/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
4 INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
5 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); see also Global 
Partnership for Education and the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:20278663~menuPK:617564~pagePK:14895
6~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282386,00.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
6 UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.int/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
7 WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/en/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
8 INT’L TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
9 See generally AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 100 WAYS IT SHAPES OUR LIVES 
(2006), available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/100%20Ways%20Booklet_2011.pdf. 
10 See FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING (2d ed. 1993). 
11 My use of “realism” in this Article means “structural realism” or “neorealism,” which employs a 
Hobbesian view of an anarchic state system and a submissive role of international law which structural 
realists or neorealists contend is a mere “epiphenomenon of underlying power” or a “coincidence of 
state interests or coercion by powerful states.”  See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power 
and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 73–76 (2006); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 105 (2010); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 185 (Stephen D. 
Krasner ed., 1983); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–
37, 118, 225 (2005).  It might be fair to say that most contemporary realists, both legal scholars and 
political scientists, are “structural realists” or “neorealists” in essence because, despite their nuanced 
acknowledgement of institutional influence of international law and international organizations, they 
still refuse to endorse a genuine “endogenous” impact of international law to state behaviors.  See 
Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 112 
(2009) (equating “structural realism” to “neorealism” as a “recent incarnation” of the classical realism). 
12 In this Article, I use “neoliberalism” and “neoliberal institutionalism” interchangeably. 
13 According to Robert Keohane, the common thesis of rationalism is substantive rationality 
represented by such factors as power, interest, and efficiency.  Robert O. Keohane, International 
Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 386–87 (1988). 
14 See Bertjan Verbeek, International Organizations: The Ugly Duckling of International Relations 
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theories, IOs are built to serve powerful states’ interests (neorealism) or 
meet certain functional needs among like-minded states (neoliberal 
institutionalism).  Under this rationalist position, while an IO may help 
preserve the extant power equilibrium (neorealism) or reduce transaction 
costs (neoliberal institutionalism), it seldom has a life of its own. 15  
Unsurprisingly, conventional IR theories tend to limit their analytical focus 
to IOs’ creation and the interstate dynamics that lead up to their creation.  
Thus, IOs’ institutional development is an underexplored issue in a 
rationalist world.16  To rationalists, an IO is a “great yawn.”17 
Nonetheless, rationalism could not capture a complete picture of an 
IO, particularly an IO’s operation.  If seen as a mere tool for states, one 
might not be able to explain how an IO evolves on its own terms as an 
autonomous entity as it incessantly interacts with its surroundings.18  An IO 
also emerges on its own terms,19 rather than being simply created by states.  
Considering an IO’s various autonomous roles, such as an arbiter and a 
manager of enforcement,20 this theoretical deficit is problematic: it fails to 
render an adequate explanation on the IO’s institutional life cycle. 
This Article proposes a novel perspective to plug the theoretical gap 
 
Theory?, in AUTONOMOUS POLICY MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Bob Reinalda & 
Bertjan Verbeek eds., 1998) (critically observing that IR scholars treat IOs as a “residual” subject which 
is “only marginally important” to the explanation of international affairs).  Regarding some notable 
exceptions, see JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1991) (addressing an internal 
organizational culture and its decision-making process); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why 
States Act through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3 (1998) (focusing on 
“centralization” and “independence” of a formal international organization).  Abbott and Snidal observed 
that “states have taken IOs more seriously than have scholars.”  Id. at 29. 
15 See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as 
Organizations, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 246 (1988); see also Harold K. Jacobson et al., National 
Entanglements and International Government Organizations, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 141 (1986). 
16 See Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization 
and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 655 (2006); see also Michael Tierney & Catherine 
Weaver, Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in 
the Study of International Organizations (Mar. 2005) (unpublished conference paper for the 
International Studies Association meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii) (on file with author) (observing that 
statist theories, such as realism, cannot fully capture IOs as “actors in their own right, making decisions 
and exercising power and influence within their normative and material environments”); see also 
ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 315 (1999) (observing that realism 
would “not preclude changes of identity and interest, as long as this occurs in the first ‘step,’ before or 
outside the interaction being analyzed”) (emphasis added).  
17 MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS vii–viii (2004) (quoting Susan Strange, Why Do IOs Never Die?, 
in AUTONOMOUS POLICY MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 213–20 (B. Reinalda & B. 
Verbeek eds., 1998)). 
18 Michael Barnett & Liv Coleman, Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in 
International Organizations, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 593, 593 (2005) (critically observing that IR scholars 
have seldom focused on the “fundamental issue of organizational change”). 
19 Keohane, supra note 13, at 389. 
20 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 22, 26. 
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precipitated by a rationalist understanding of IOs.  Blending a new trend of 
IR theories (constructivism)21 with the identity theory in developmental 
psychology, the Article probes an IO’s internal development in which one 
can witness a dynamic legal process of identity formation.  This 
interdisciplinary approach proffers a theoretical framework that 
demonstrates how an IO, as a socio-legal actor, develops, transforms, and 
becomes more sophisticated. 
The Article argues that based on its autonomy22 as an independent 
organization—and not merely as an instrument of states—an IO forms its 
organizational identity as it experiences an identity crisis similar to the way 
in which a person does.  Initially, states create IOs to serve a specific 
function.  Thus, IOs may have default purposes that their creators (states) 
have programmed into them.  However, an IO’s retention of this 
programmed purpose results from a mere identification with its creators, 
not from the genuine identity that the IO has formed at subsequent stages 
during the course of its legal-institutional evolution.  An IO acquires its 
organizational identity only after it achieves a necessary level of 
institutional maturity through legal interactions and communications with 
its environment. 
This process is certainly no less daunting to an IO than to a person 
because an IO also suffers strains and pressures from its role expectation in 
the international society.  Just as an adolescent experiences an identity 
crisis in interactions with peers and with society in general, an IO is 
exposed to a similar ordeal in adjusting its normative goals to various 
external pressures.  In particular, IOs often undergo a testing situation 
where their old structures grow increasingly incapable of coping with new 
demands from their altered environment.  Confronted with this crisis, IOs 
may attempt to reconfigure their legal-institutional setting by fine-tuning 
their original teleology to a call from their new environment.  Only then 
will the IOs’ organizational existence remain relevant, therefore, creating a 
socio-legal reality23 by forming a genuine identity. 
Against this backdrop, the Article attempts to theorize IOs’ legal-
institutional development as independent organizations from the standpoint 
of identity formation, and tests this proposed theory by applying it to the 
WTO.  Part II of this Article discusses a theoretical foundation for the 
 
21 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
22 An IO’s autonomy may be weak or strong.  A “weak autonomy” is a de jure autonomy existing 
only in the book rendered by an IO’s legal personality.  Yet a “strong autonomy” is a de facto autonomy 
substantiated by such criteria as the size of membership, the size of bureaucracy, the frequency and 
density of operation (activities), and the organizational output (norms and other behavioral guidelines).  
In those institutions having a strong autonomy the process of identity-formation is an observable 
phenomenon enabled by a sufficient period of organizational duration and a rich amount of institutional 
experiences. 
23 See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS 6–7 (2004). 
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analysis (i.e., the autonomy of an IO).  One cannot construct an IO’s 
identity without first identifying its autonomy vis-à-vis its member states.  
Specifically, Part II contrasts social theories, which recognize an IO’s 
autonomy, with traditional IR theories, which regard an IO as an instrument 
of states.  Part II also highlights identity formation as a norm-based process 
engineered by rules and legal discourse. 
Part III constructs a theory regarding IOs’ identity formation.  Part III 
first raises a case of anthropomorphism.  In probing an IO’s identity 
formation, one may apply an analogy of a person to an IO—both entities 
are social actors that interact with their environment for survival. 24  
Anthropomorphism lays a foundation for an interdisciplinary methodology 
informed by social science.  After sketching Erik Erikson’s celebrated 
identity theory,25 Part III applies this theory to IOs, in addition to outlining 
various parameters of identity formation—history, environment, goals, and 
technology. 
Part IV tests the theory of an IO’s identity formation by applying it to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the 
WTO.  Part IV demonstrates how the WTO experienced an identity crisis 
as the original pro-trade bias embedded in its old self (GATT) embraced 
new challenges involving nontrade values, such as protection of the 
environment and human health.  Part IV also proposes an optimal path for 
the WTO’s development, which embodies an institutional balance between 
traditional trade values and these nontrade values.   
Finally, a disclaimer is in order.  This Article does not intend to 
debunk traditional IR theories generally.  Granted, their parsimony may 
explain state behaviors with regards to an IO more clearly than what is 
proposed in the Article.  In particular, to the extent that states constitute a 
critical environment to an IO, powerful members’ interests may still 
constrain the scope of an IO’s autonomy.26  Rather, this Article aims to fill 
in some of the blind spots of traditional IR theories, such as social theories 
on IOs.  It purports to provide an overview on IOs’ endogenous-normative 
dynamics and serve as a preliminary yet useful avenue for further 
discussions in this nascent field. 
 
II.  ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AUTONOMOUS? 
 
Are IOs Autonomous?  This part attempts to answer this question by 
first analyzing the functional view that denies IOs’ autonomy.  It then turns 
to blind spots that the functional view leaves behind, such as the 
 
24 See, e.g., Barnett & Coleman, supra note 18, at 594 (regarding IOs as actors which adopt various 
strategies to cope with environmental pressures and arguing that these strategies lead to “change in their 
tasks, design, and mandate”) (emphasis added). 
25 See infra Part III.A. 
26 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 8, 19. 
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incapability of adequately explaining IOs’ institutional evolution.  Finally, 
this part embraces the IOs’ autonomy by probing organizational norms and 
identity. 
 
A.  Functionalism and Its Discontents 
 
Conventional IR theories tend to regard an IO as a machinery of 
interstate cooperation.  These theories posit that sovereign states create and 
operate IOs to achieve a better world system by enmeshing them in 
mutually beneficial transactions.27  This rationalistic approach highlights an 
IO’s functional merits, which include reducing uncertainty and transaction 
costs in the absence of any specific institutional context.28  This is an 
economistic approach that assumes that states prioritize their interests to 
maximize efficiency and therefore use IOs as rational instruments to 
achieve such goals.29  
This inorganic view of IOs may be a logical conclusion with regards 
to traditional IR theories, including neorealism, which are theories about 
states.30  These theories aim to analyze and understand why and how states 
interact and cooperate among themselves, which is evident in their 
appellation, international relations.  This state centered view rejects an IO’s 
ontological autonomy31 as a self-governing, purposive actor.  Under this 
framework, even if an IO may facilitate or constrain certain state behaviors 
by creating and controlling the flow of information between states, that 
causality still does not give the IO autonomy. 32   For example, to 
neorealists, any meaningful contributions by IOs are made through and by 
states.  In sum, IOs exert no independent impact on state behavior.33 
Absent autonomy, the actual operation or evolution of an IO in its 
post-creation stages remains underexplored.34  Neorealists may infer certain 
hypotheses about changes in an IO since its creation. 35   But those 
hypotheses are unsatisfactory because an institutional change, itself, tends 
 
27 Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 246; Jacobson et al., supra note 15, at 142. 
28 Keohane, supra note 13, at 390. 
29 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); see also THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 3–4 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991); Anna Grandori, 
Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency Constructs in the Economics and Sociology of International 
Organizations, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 61 (S. Lindenberg 
& H. Shreuder eds., 1993). 
30 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 706. 
31 See id. at 704. 
32 Id. 
33 See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1995). 
34 Helfer, supra note 16, at 658. 
35 Id. 
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to be at odds with neorealism.  Change is either bracketed36 or thrust upon 
an IO by its state creators by changes in the state’s national interests or 
preferences.37  Therefore, change is a recreation of an IO by states due to 
asymmetrical external shocks, such as disasters, 38  rather than an 
evolutionary or adaptive process resulting from continuous, incremental 
institutional development.  In sum, any institutional changes within an IO 
are reduced back to international cooperation among states.39 
Moreover, because neorealists regard an IO as a mere tool, they often 
fail to heed the unique attributes and contexts deeply associated with a 
particular organization.  Therefore, neorealists tend to even treat effective 
IOs in the same way as ineffective ones,40 seldom taking into account IOs’ 
variances in performance and legitimacy. 
Notably, some adaptions of neorealism, such as the regime theory,41 
recognize the possibility of IOs’ direct impact on states’ behaviors.42  
Regimes can be broadly defined as issue specific arrangements that 
facilitate states’ cooperation by coordinating their behaviors and stabilizing 
their expectations.43  Regime theory focuses on institutions’ functional 
aspects where states routinely cooperate over specific issues to reduce 
uncertainty and transaction costs, provide information, and stabilize 
expectations, even in the absence of centralized authority.44 
Nonetheless, even this adapted position cannot fully escape from the 
core realist tenet.  A regime may facilitate interstate cooperation only to the 
extent that such cooperation serves powerful states.45  But regime theorists 
still refuse to recognize IOs’ endogenous impact on states’ behavior.46  
 
36 See id. at 661; Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections Between Historical and Rational 
Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN HISTORICAL 
AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005). 
37 Helfer, supra note 16, at 661. 
38 Id. at 662. 
39 Keohane, supra note 13, at 379. 
40 Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 247–48 (“Few have noted that organizations differ over time, 
or that they perform differently from one another, or that they achieve their ends with varying 
effectiveness or efficiency.”). 
41 In the 1970s, an intellectual thirst for a systematic explanation of “international governance” 
amid an “anomaly” of developments, such as the relative decline of U.S. hegemony and the rise of 
OEPC, gravitated many scholars toward the “international regime” theory.  Friedrich Kratochwil & 
John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT’L 
ORG. 753, 759–60 (1986). 
42 Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 11, at 75. 
43 Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 41, at 759–60. 
44 Keohane, supra note 13, at 386. 
45 See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at 
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004). 
46 Regime theorists still regard regimes as “outcomes,” failing to ask such questions as “to what 
extent has the existence of regimes significantly affected the behavior of actors?”  Verbeek, supra note 
14, at 13.  In some occasions, states accord an IO a false autonomy simply to deflect any direct criticism 
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According to them, even the strongest cooperation facilitated by a regime 
could not make it an independent organization.47  Thus, it is no wonder 
that, to regime theorists, a regime is quite fragile; it exists against the 
backdrop of anarchy, which constrains interstate cooperation and is hard to 
achieve even when states share common interests.48  As a corollary, regime 
theory fails to address two important organizational issues.  First, it cannot 
fully explain an organic interaction between IOs and their environment.  
Second, regime theory cannot evaluate whether each regime is as legitimate 
or effective as an independent organization since all of the regime’s 
performance is attributable logically to states. 
Neoliberal institutionalists appear to offer a more advanced 
explanation of IOs’ autonomy than earlier institutionalists, such as regime 
theorists.  Neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge that IOs may be an 
independent variable since they can condition and regulate states’ 
behavior. 49   Nonetheless, even under neoliberalism, an IO’s role in 
international politics does not go deep enough to constitute states’ interests 
and identities.50  Thus, even neoliberal institutionalists might be tempted to 
circumvent global norms once they conclude that those norms are 
inconsistent with their liberal agenda.  To that extent, neoliberal 
institutionalists also regard regimes, and by extension IOs, as tools for 
states to advance domestic values and preferences. 51   According to 
neoliberal institutionalism, states would cease to support an IO if it does 
not meet their demands.52 
Furthermore, neoliberal institutionalism still encounters certain 
difficulties in developing a genuine macro theory on IOs that fully explains 
and predicts an IO’s evolution on its own terms, not due to member states’ 
interests or preferences.53  To neoliberal institutionalists, an IO’s disciplinary 
(supranational) authority may be delegated from the member states 
 
toward them in pursuing certain goals.  Yet this is a variation of the instrumental view, not a genuine 
organizational autonomy that this Article addresses.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 14, at 18–19 
(describing this variation of instrumentalism as “laundering”). 
47 In this context, the regime literatures did not surpass those of general international relations even 
in its heyday (1980s).  See Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 41, at 761. 
48 See Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT’L ORG. 485, 485 (1988); Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real 
Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 554–55 (2004). 
49 Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, 20 INT’L SEC. 39, 
46 (1995). 
50 Jeffrey T. Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 
324, 327–28 (1998). 
51 Christian Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of 
Fundamental Institutions, 51 INT’L ORG. 555, 555 (1997). 
52 Barnett & Coleman, supra note , at 594. 
53 Institutionalists observe that “international institutions are created in response to state interests, 
and that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities.”  See Keohane & 
Martin, supra note 49, at 47. 
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themselves54 rather than emerging from within over time. 
In sum, the rationalist primacy attributed to states and the consequent, 
instrumental role of IOs does not embrace IOs’ autonomy even with 
theoretical finessing. 
 
B.  Embracing the Organizational Autonomy 
 
The Westphalian tradition of public international law, built on the 
notion of state sovereignty, might not fully embrace the constructivist logic 
of an IO’s ontological independence because it would undermine states’ 
monopoly of power.  Under the traditional view, the only restriction on a 
state’s sovereign power was self-restriction.55  In other words, treaties 
created by sovereign states’ consent could only regulate the concerned 
states because the sovereign states had given their word, not because those 
treaties constituted an autonomous organization of elevated hierarchy.  
However, the traditional notion of sovereignty was vulnerable to the 
Hobbesian struggle, eventually leading to two world wars.  Thus, it was no 
coincidence that the postwar reconstruction of international order was 
conducted through independent IOs that would govern states’ behaviors.  
Interestingly, postwar IOs play unique regulatory roles in certain sector 
specific areas, such as collective security—the United Nations (UN)—and 
international financial regulation—the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The postwar prominence of IOs engendered new international law that 
put the IOs’ legal personality and organizational autonomy under the 
spotlight.56  First, Charters of IOs declared their legal personalities.  Article 
104 of the UN provides that “the Organization shall enjoy in the territory of 
each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the 
exercise of its functions and the fulfilment [sic] of its purposes.”57  Article 
8:1 of the WTO Agreement also provides that the “WTO shall have legal 
personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members such legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions.”58 
Likewise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its Reparation 
case, ruled that an IO is a “subject of international law and capable of 
 
54 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 144–45 (2005). 
55 The classical concept of sovereignty of nation states, which was deeply territorial, emerged in 
Europe at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia).  It meant an absolute 
control of a national state within its own border.  According to this historical concept, a sovereign state 
answers no higher authority, including an IO.  See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 
AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (1948).  
56 Before the Second World War, the notion of international personalities was debatable.  See 
Giuseppe Marchegiano, The Juristic Character of the International Commission of Cape Spartel 
Lighthouse, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 339, 339 (1931). 
57 U.N. Charter art. 104, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml. 
58 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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possessing international rights and duties.”59  Based on this legal capability, 
an IO holds the capacity to sue a state, regardless of the state’s membership 
to the organization, for damage caused by a violation by the state of its 
obligation toward the organization.60  It is based on this line that the 
International Law Commission (ILC) is working to create a draft article 
governing IOs’ legal responsibility to seek damages from the offending 
state or other IOs.61  
Furthermore, modern international law also recognizes the IOs’ 
professional identity, accentuating their distinctive functional mandate and 
competence.  For example, the ICJ rejected the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) request to deliver an advisory opinion addressing 
whether states’ use of nuclear weapons violates international law because 
this issue did not fall within the rubric of the WHO’s activities.62  This 
decision acknowledges that each IOs’ distinguishable mission warrants 
organizational autonomy. 
Nonetheless, the existence of an IO’s legal personality should not 
necessarily be equated with the IO’s independent status separate from its 
creator-states.63  Legal capacity may not be a sufficient condition for 
genuine autonomy.  Varying institutional arrangements of IOs determine 
different patterns of governance and degrees of autonomy.  Although the 
UN has its own legal personality, the UN is incapable of making any 
autonomous decisions over critical subjects, such as security, against the 
will of powerful members with veto powers.  Furthermore, even if an IO 
enjoys a certain level of autonomy, sovereign states, which transfer part of 
their autonomy to the IO, may want to retract such a transfer.64 
Nonetheless, an IO’s legal-institutional detachment from its members 
is still an important avenue for the IO’s socio-political autonomy.  In line 
with Weberian legal-rational authority in bureaucracy, legal personality 
tends to benefit an IO in claiming decisional authority on various issues 
and challenges falling within the rubric of its mandate.  Along with this 
legal capacity follows other institutional software and hardware used to 
maintain its operational autonomy, such as operational rules, secretariat, 
 
59 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11, 1949). 
60 Id. at 179–80. 
61 Analytical Guide: Responsibility of International Organizations, INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un. 
org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm (last updated July 10, 2014); Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, INT’L LAW COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/ 
9_11_2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).  
62 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
63 David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse 
at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (1996). 
64 ANNA MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF MINORITIES 
AND INDIGENOUS 38 (2001). 
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and the budget.  For example, an IO may demand that its members pay 
dues.65 
Importantly, an IO’s legal personhood enables us to employ legal 
rhetoric with which we investigate and study an IO’s operation.66  Those 
legal narratives offer unique perspectives in understanding an IO’s 
autonomy in terms of establishing consistent precedent and providing 
reasoned arguments conditioned on rules and principles, rather than 
particular states’ interest.67  As discussed above, however, this normative 
dynamic has blind spots under conventional IR theories. 
Here, “constructivism” provides a social framework of organization 
building because it highlights how the shared norms emerge in an IO, 
become internalized, and eventually transform the behaviors of state 
actors.68  While rationalism views that only exogenous (material) factors, 
such as power and interest, determine state behaviors, constructivism 
highlights that endogenous (ideational) factors, such as culture and values, 
can also guide such behaviors.69  This endogenous social dynamic glues 
member states together with or without material incentives.  Under 
constructivism, an IO’s ontological autonomy results from its social norms 
composed of shared culture, knowledge, and discourse.  First, social norms 
provide member states with a medium through which to communicate 
among, and thus understand, one another, much like a shared language.70  
Second, as these norm-governed interactions proliferate the original terms 
of individual identities gradually transform into a collective identity based 
on the “we” notion.71 
These legal discourses inform, inter alia, two paramount issues which 
concern IOs’ autonomy: (1) what IOs produce, and (2) how they develop.  
First, some legal scholars have highlighted noticeable norm-generating 
(“jurisgenerative”) 72  phenomena in certain areas within sector specific 
 
65 See, e.g., UN Charter art. 19 (“A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the 
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if 
the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding 
two full years.”). 
66 KIRGIS, supra note 10, at vii–viii. 
67 Id. at viii. 
68 Verbeek, supra note 14, at 13. 
69 WENDT, supra note 16, at 215. 
70 See Kenneth Abbott, Economic Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of 
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996); Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing 
Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the 
International Trade Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81, 84–85, 95, 105–06 (2006) (employing a 
“constructivist” perspective on the WTO system).  Regarding the communicative action in a society in 
general, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 11 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1998). 
71 Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 384, 388–91 (1994) [hereinafter International State]. 
72 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
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regulatory IOs.  These scholars focus on vibrant government regulatory 
networks harbored by IOs in which epistemic socialization among like-
minded government officials and other professionals crystallize into 
tangible normative products, such as guidelines and recommendations.73  
Markedly, legally defined mandates and membership flowing from, and 
anchored by, an IO’s legal personality tend to secure specialization and 
professional authority for these IOs.  These regulatory IOs are represented 
not by government officials from the Department of State or the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs but by transgovernmental regulators from sector-specific 
departments, such as the Department of Treasury or the Ministry of 
Finance, whose common set of belief transcends national boundaries.74  An 
IO’s legal personality tends to promote this mentalités collectives by 
providing professional forums that enjoy a certain level of detachment from 
a culture of direct delegation.75 
For example, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) harbors a transgovernmental network of securities 
regulators whose collective goals are articulated in a professional, not 
ambassadorial, fashion (i.e., to “establish standards and an effective 
surveillance of international securities transactions”).76  The IOSCO has 
issued a number of professional standards within its mandate, such as the 
“Risk Management and Control Guidance for Securities Firms and their 
Supervisors.”77  Despite its nonbinding nature, firms in each jurisdiction 
 
ARTICLES OF ROBERT COVER 110 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992). 
73 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); SLAUGHTER, supra note 54; Sungjoon Cho, 
Transgovernmentalism: A New Jurisgenerative Mechanism (forthcoming) (on file with author).  This 
idea of transgovernmental government networks dates back to the 1970s.  See Robert O. Keohane & 
Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 44 
(1974); Raymond F. Hopkins, Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic 
Bureaucracies, 30 INT. SOC. SCI. J. 31, 31 (1978).  Some scholars describe this term differently, but 
more or less give it the same meaning.  For instance, one scholar named the Basel Accord as a 
“gentlemen’s agreement among central banks.”  Hal Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basel 
Capital Accord, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 885 (1995).  Another scholar termed the same work as 
“international soft law.”  JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY 
STANDARDS 176–77, 261–62 (1995). 
74 John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement After Barings and Daiwa, 935 
PLI/CORP. 681, 708 (1996). 
75 John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993). 
76 General Information on IOSCO, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS (IOSCO), http://www.iosco.org/ 
about/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
77 IOSCO, RISK MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL GUIDANCE FOR SECURITIES FIRMS AND THEIR 
SUPERVISORS: A REPORT BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF 
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 1 (May 1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOS 
COPD78.pdf. 
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expect to implement these regulatory prototypes. 78   This normative 
authority, as it is repeated and reinforced, equips these IOs with an aura of 
professional legitimacy, which in turn leads to a level of self-governance. 
Second, an IO’s legal personality is also inductive of a dynamic 
understanding of its authentic institutional self.  Since the juridical 
personhood warrants a certain level of permanence in its institutional 
existence, in particular vis-à-vis agreements (treaties), one can engage in a 
serious exploration of an IO’s unique pathway from creation through 
institutional evolution as a legally distinct entity (person).  This facilitates a 
panoramic comprehension of the IO’s operational autonomy.  From a 
normative perspective, forming an IO’s identity means establishing 
institutional criteria for behaviors or policies acceptable to the IO.  
Throughout its institutional lifetime, an IO embraces a different set of 
policies determined by its own understanding of its rationale (object and 
purpose). 
Finally, an IO’s autonomy should not translate into its disconnection 
from the environment.  The natural or open system perspective views IOs 
as social groups desiring to survive by adapting to their particular 
environment.79  Therefore, organizations are even capable of modifying 
their original goals to survive in the changing environment.  Philip 
Selznick’s celebrated institutional approach perfects this theory of 
organizational autonomy from the standpoint of this natural or open 
system. 80   According to Selznick, institutionalization enables social 
integration within an organization by converting randomly scattered 
technical activities into regularized and meaningful patterns.81  Crucially, 
this institutionalization presupposes an open system that is distinguishable 
from a closed system, such as a cybernetic machine, which passively 
channels states’ inputs.  By actively interacting with the environment, an 
organization obtains both special capacity and character, 82  while also 
establishing its value.83 
 
C.  Summary 
 
To sum up the argument presented above, conventional IR theories, 
often dubbed as rationalism, treat IOs as mere instruments to aid states 
achieve various functional needs.  An instrument does not have its own 
autonomy—a logical conclusion from intrinsic theoretical assumptions of 
 
78 Id. 
79 See RICHARD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 57 (3d ed. 
1992); Alvin W. Gouldner, Organizational Analysis, in SOCIOLOGY TODAY 404–05 (1959). 
80 See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 17 (1957). 
81 LEONARD BROOM & PHILIP SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 238 (1955). 
82 Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270 (1996). 
83 SELZNICK, supra note 80, at 17. 
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rationalism.  Under rationalism, material incentives are sole determinants 
for state behaviors while states’ interests are prefixed. 
However, the social approach proposed in this Article focuses on the 
rich socio-legal dynamic within an IO.  Legal discourses among states 
within an IO, if regularized and institutionalized, transform states’ 
perception of interest and identity.  The emergence of an IO’s autonomy 
parallels a gradual shift from the original individual identities of states to 
an IO’s collective identity.  The next part explores the formation of this 
collective identity. 
 
III.  THEORIZING AN IDENTITY FORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Having demonstrated that instrumentalism is misguided and should be 
replaced by autonomism, this part attempts to theorize the dynamic process 
of an IO’s identity formation by drawing on human psychology.  This 
theoretical borrowing or analogy may be controversial.  Nonetheless, a 
common operational structure exists between an IO and a human being, 
particularly the way that each entity responds to and interacts with its 
environment for survival and development.  This common structure 
eventually warrants the interdisciplinary approach.  The identity theory in 
developmental psychology can be a useful theoretical avenue to illustrate 
an IO’s dynamic transformation in its life cycle, which remains largely 
unexplained by the traditional IR theories. 
 
A.  The Identity Theory: Borrowing Insights from Psychology 
 
A person’s identity impacts every aspect of her life, such as habit 
formation and interaction with others.84   A preeminent developmental 
psychologist, Erik Erikson, suggested that a human being develops her 
identity by combining her understanding of the environment (group 
identity) and her own personal characters (personal identity).85  Erikson’s 
approach is often dubbed psychosocial; he posited that the individual and 
society are closely interrelated in their dynamic changes.86  His theory 
generally interlocks societal demands with individual development forces 
 
84 See Amélie O. Rorty & David Wong, Aspects of Identity and Agency, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, 
AND MORALITY: ARTICLES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 19 (1990). 
85 See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968) [hereinafter CRISIS]; see also 
Willem L. Wardekker, Identity, Plurality, and Education, in THE YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
EDUCATION (1995). 
86 CRISIS, supra note 85, at 114; see also Jane Kroger, Identity Formation, in THE FUTURE OF 
IDENTITY: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGACY OF ERIK ERIKSON 61–63 (Kenneth Hoover ed., 
2004); JANE KROGER, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: ADOLESCENCE THROUGH ADULTHOOD 25 (2d ed. 2007). 
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in discussing identity and its formation.87 
In particular, Erikson’s theory of identity formation focuses on a 
dynamic pathway of human psychology in which an individual human 
being searches for, and eventually establishes, her genuine identity.  This 
dynamic pathway is based on a human being’s need to cope incessantly 
with the inevitable conflicts between prior and subsequent identifications 
with the environment as well as between the different social roles that these 
identifications may carry with them.  Erikson posited an epigenic 
development model of identity formation in which every individual human 
being traverses through various stages in a life cycle, with each stage 
having its own set of circumstances of particular sensitivity, identity crisis, 
and potential.88  The individual becomes a different person in each stage 
with different cognitive capacities and increasingly develops an ability to 
interact with a wider range of people. 
 
1.  Identity Formation: An Early Stage 
 
Infants identify themselves entirely with their parents. 89  
Subsequently, children also tend to attach themselves to other particular 
adults around them, such as their teachers and parents of their friends, and 
often imitate these adults’ occupations. 90   Erikson characterized 
adolescence as a transition period from childhood into adulthood where an 
adolescent is engaged in the process of defining his own existence.91  In 
adolescence, the former function of identification and attachment to values 
and roles, based on those of individuals one admires, is replaced by identity 
formation.92 
The adolescent declares a moratorium on adulthood while 
experimenting with different roles.93  Erikson wrote that, during this stage, 
adolescents focus on defining themselves in terms of what they believe, 
what their goals are, and where they fit in society.94  Adolescence, as the 
last stage of childhood, ends only when an individual replaces her 
childhood identifications with a new type of identification resulting from 
 
87 See KROGER, supra note 86, at 25. 
88 See CRISIS, supra note 85, at 91–141 (describing the different stages of the human life cycle). 
89 Id. at 115. 
90 Id. at 122. 
91 Id. at 156–65. 
92 Id. at 22–23 (“Identity formation employs a process of simultaneous reflection and observation, a 
process taking place on all levels of mental functioning, by which the individual judges himself in the 
light of what he perceived to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to 
a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he 
perceived himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him.”). 
93 See id. at 128 (explaining the developmental challenges of adolescents as they develop a sense of 
identity). 
94 ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261–63 (1950). 
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socialization and competition among its peers, which reveals the 
individual’s own integrated values and preferences.95  An individual will be 
formed only after the careful denial and assimilation of childhood 
identifications are attuned to a new configuration recognized by society. 
 
2.  Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis 
 
The final identity, although it includes all significant identifications 
with key figures of the past, processes them in a way that builds a 
distinctive yet sensibly coherent whole.96  During the final stage of identity 
formation, adolescents tend to suffer greatly from role confusion.97  Past 
multiple identifications, and the roles that they prescribe, often conflict 
with one other.  This disturbance is tantamount to a crisis or “a war within 
themselves.”98  
Adolescents acquire a sense of direction only after weathering this 
Strum und Drang. 99   Then, they finally discover their suitability in 
society.100  In this sense, the identity crisis is more of a rite of passage, 
rather than a calamity.101  Erikson argued that the successful resolution of 
the identity crisis had a long lasting impact on the future stability and 
security of the individual and their ability to uphold commitments, deal 
with future hardships, and sustain relationships.102 
 
3.  The Failure of Identity Formation 
 
Identity formation is not always successful.  Adolescents often 
demonstrate a variety of pathological symptoms in the course of identity 
formation.  They may fail to resolve tension in their engagement with 
others, which leads to a state of disorientation.103  Erikson has labeled these 
pathologies as “identity confusion” or “identity diffusion.”  For example, 
they may make no commitments, or show no fidelity, to their genuine 
identity, as they do not experience an identity crisis.104  They may also act 
baby-like (“diffusion of time perspective”), become unable to work or 
 
95 Id. at 155. 
96 Id. at 161. 
97 Id. at 163–64. 
98 CRISIS, supra note 85, at 17. 
99 Id. at 165. 
100 Id. at 161. 
101 Id. at 16. 
102 Id. at 165. 
103 Id. at 212. 
104 See James E. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Statuses, 3 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSY. 551–58 (1966).  To some scholars identity diffusion may be characterized as “identity 
deficit” or “motivation crisis,” which denotes a lack of commitments and precise self-definition.  Roy F. 
Baumeister et al., Two Kinds of Identity Crisis, 53 J. PERSONALITY 407, 409–11 (1985). 
CHO_FINAL_WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/3/14 7:22 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business                                                           34:359 (2014) 
 
376 
concentrate (“diffusion of industry”), or choose to be antisocial and hostile 
(“negative identity”).105 
Other problematic identity statuses include “foreclosure” and 
“moratorium.”  Foreclosure refers to a state in which adolescents have 
already made commitments to a certain identity without seriously exploring 
various identities available.  Moratorium means that adolescents merely 
engage in such exploration without making any commitments.106  In both 
situations, adolescents fail to form a genuine identity by the lack of either 
the search itself or accompanied commitments. 
 
B.  Is an International Organization a Person? 
 
1.  A Case for Anthropomorphism 
 
Applying a psychological theory, such as Erikson’s identity theory, to 
an IO’s operation necessitates a certain degree of anthropomorphism, 
which has its limits.  Simply, one might not equate an IO’s identity with 
that of a person.  After all, an IO’s identity may not be as coherent as that 
of a person since biology tends to accord her a more unitary identity than 
that of a corporate agency such as an IO.107  It is also conceivable that a 
tension exists within an IO’s identity, more precisely between an IO’s 
collective identity and some states’ individual identities.108  Under certain 
circumstances, the short term interest of some powerful member states may 
undermine the unitary nature of the IO’s holistic institutional structure 
represented by the collective identity. 
Nonetheless, it is still true that both a person’s behavior and an IO’s 
operation can be observed as an outcome of each entity’s own 
intentionality.  An IO’s action is no more reducible to its individual 
member states than a human action is reducible to chemical reactions in the 
brain.109  In so far as both a person’s behavior and an IO’s action can be 
observed as real on its own terms, one can explain and predict such 
behavior and action.110  To this extent, one could draw on psychology, such 
as Erikson’s identity theory, to better understand the identity dynamics of 
an IO, bearing in mind the aforementioned caveat on anthropomorphism. 
Again, sociologist narratives tend to make unique contributions in 
accommodating anthropomorphism to understand IOs’ operational 
autonomy in their organizational lifetimes (i.e., how they evolve and what 
they generate), which eventually supply the foundation for the formation of 
 
105 ERIKSON, supra note 94, at 167–73. 
106 Id. 
107 WENDT, supra note 16, at 221. 
108 Id. at 337. 
109 Id. at 221. 
110 Id. at 223. 
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their identities.  One way of advancing an IO’s identity formation is to 
project this dynamic process into a well-established paradigm of human 
developmental psychology.  Carefully reflecting on an IO’s operational 
nature tends to warrant this anthropomorphism. 
 As a juridical person, an IO is an autonomous, organic entity that 
owes its existence to its own incessant adaptations to its ever-changing 
environment, much like a human being.  Unlike a closed system, such as a 
cybernetic system, in which inputs from the environment can never change 
internal elements of an organization, both humans and organizations are 
open systems that can self-sustain by adjusting to the environment.111  The 
environment provides an organization with necessary material resources, 
such as hardware (physical infrastructure), software (technology), and 
“humanware” (staff), as well as symbolic resources, such as reputation.112  
This shift in the analytical focus from a closed to open system highlights 
the critical significance that the environment exerts on organizational 
identity,113 as it does on the human identity.  Like a human being, an 
organization pursues a homeostatic equilibrium vis-à-vis the external 
environment as it builds and adapts its individuality in its institutional 
development.114 
 
2.  A Corporate Identity as a Supporting Analogy 
 
In fact, some organization theorists have already devoted their 
attention to certain self-conceptions collectively held by members of an 
organization such as a corporation.  This “corporate identity” can be 
defined as a consistent and durable set of values that each organization 
uniquely holds.115  The corporate identity offers yet more support for using 
an identity theory analogy in studying the dynamic transformation of 
IOs.116 
Indeed, many scholars of business administration have focused on a 
corporate identity, drawing on lessons from psychology.  Their common 
observation is that a corporation, like a human being, develops its identity 
through an unremitting process of interaction with its environment for its 
own survival.117  At the same time, a corporation’s identity formation 
process is also normative in that human beings and corporations pursue 
 
111 See SCOTT, supra note 79, at 89; WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS 
THEORY 50 (1967). 
112 See Barnett & Coleman, supra note 18, at 597, 599. 
113 See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 249. 
114 See SCOTT, supra note 79, at 60. 
115 See Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, in 6 RESEARCH IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 265 (L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw eds., 1985). 
116 See Dennis Bromley, Relationships Between Personal and Corporate Reputation, 35 EUR. J. OF 
MARKETING 316, 318 (2001) (observing the tendency to “personify” an organization). 
117 See Peter Gorb, The Psychology of Corporate Identity, 10 EUR. MGMT. J. 310, 312 (1992). 
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individual and corporate ideals, respectively, as they decide how they 
should respond to challenges from their environment.118 
Shortly after its creation, a corporation tends to be highly utilitarian 
and is identified with its leader’s ideology.119  A corporation, like a human 
being, desires to preserve its self-esteem and avoids any psychological pain 
and discomfort by mobilizing various defense mechanisms.120  However, to 
survive the challenging environment through capacity building, a 
“learning” corporation embraces evolving identities through critical self-
reflection and discourse about future identities.121  Since an identity is of an 
enduring and conservative nature, its development process may be 
unstable, as in the case of an adolescent.122 
A corporation adjusts its original identity to the need of its 
environment as it internally reflects on its external perception (images) 
received from the environment, including the media, regulators, 
competitors, and customers.123   As a corporation responds to external 
challenges, its members form an internal normative belief through 
socialization which defies the original identity identified with its founder’s 
ideology.124 
 
C.  Toward a Theory of an International Organization’s Identity 
 
Against the background discussed above, the first point of analogy 
from Erikson’s identity theory to an IO’s identity theory is an actor’s 
transformative interaction with its environment.  Similar to adolescents’ 
identity formation process, both corporations and IOs also experience 
certain socialization pressures from their environment.  As a result, these 
organizations are often forced to diversify their institutional selves into 
multiple roles that should eventually be integrated into an internally 
coherent identity.125  Naturally, identity formation is not a smooth process 
for either a human being or an organization.  It may be accompanied by 
confusion, fatigue, and stress.  In short, it is a crisis. 
 
 
118 See Bromley, supra note 116, at 330. 
119 See Henry Mintzberg, Power and Organizational Life Cycles, 9 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 207, 210 (1984). 
120 See Andrew D. Brown & Ken Starkey, Organizational Identity and Learning: A Psychodynamic 
Perspective, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 102, 104 (2000). 
121 See id. at 108.  Brown and Starkey call a learning organization a “wise” organization.  Id. at 113. 
122 See Dennis A. Gioia et al., Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability, 25 ACAD. 
OF MGMT. REV. 63, 65 (2000). 
123 See id. at 65, 70. 
124 See Mintzberg, supra note 119, at 210, 211. 
125 See Susan Harter, Self and Identity Development, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING 
ADOLESCENT 358 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds., 1990). 
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1.  Identity Formation: An Early Stage 
 
Under Erikson’s identity theory, children identify themselves with 
their parents, and to be more precise, with their parents’ culture and value 
system.  This domestic dimension of historical legacy is thrust upon 
children as the first factor that provides a foundation for their identity 
formation.  In case of a corporation, its founders often leave enduring 
impacts, both positive and negative, on its subsequent development of 
corporate identity.126 
Likewise, the founding history of an IO renders an initial influence on 
their identities.  As an internalized past, this history tends to determine, or 
at least correlate with, present and future behaviors of IOs by frontloading 
founding states’ rationale and character.  Like DNA in the human body, the 
organizational history bestows upon IOs a certain institutional heredity, 
thereby marking a unique path dependence for each organization.  The 
organizational history is often used as an interpretive criterion for 
determining whether organizations’ or their participants’ behavior is 
permitted or prohibited under their charters or constitutions.127 
Interestingly, the tenacious impact of history on each IO’s identity 
formation stems from the fact that it cannot be simply discarded or 
disposed of even if it subsequently becomes obsolete or ineffective.  
Purging an old organization and restarting afresh would be costly.  In this 
sense, all institutional changes tend to be path dependent.  More often than 
not, sunk costs make old patterns survive a long time before new ones 
prove the former obsolete.128  Old habits die hard and relics of the former 
structure or culture remain even though they might be cocooned beneath a 
new institutional coating. 
 
2.  Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis 
 
As is the case in human identity formation, the environment is a 
critical parameter to the formation of an organizational identity.  An 
organizational identity is shaped by an IO’s conscious interactions with the 
environment and guided by an organization’s role expectation, as well as 
the expectations that the organization perceives from its environment 
(society).  Organizational sociologists have long adhered to an open system 
where varying environments exert critical impact on how organizations 
 
126 See Henry Mintzberg, Power and Organizational Life Cycles, 9 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 207, 
209–10 (1984). 
127 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 332 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
128 See ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 120–21 (1968). 
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behave and perform.129  This unremitting process of challenge and response 
between an IO and the environment can be viewed as an IO’s identity 
crisis.  An IO processes complex information provided by the environment 
and forms its identity in accordance with the messages contained in those 
challenges.130   In this sense, an IO’s identity crisis emerges amid an 
assiduous dialogue with the environment.131 
As a legal person, an IO’s identity crisis can be translated into a 
normative process.  As discussed above, identity forming organizational 
changes, which are inevitable for an IO’s institutional survival, are 
basically teleological132 and constitutive since these changes define and 
redefine its organizational goals, and thus regulate the behavior of members 
and the organization itself.133  This teleological and constitutive process is 
best captured by norms and legal discourse within an IO.  Legal principles 
and legal arguments mediate intersubjective discourse and interaction 
among members, as well as between members and the IO itself.134 
Organizational goals are a leitmotif of an IO’s norm driven identity 
crisis.  They are the rationale of its existence.  Initially, they are given by 
an IO’s creators (states) and often engraved in its charter.  Organizational 
goals provide essential interpretive guidance when IOs’ determine whether 
a certain action is acceptable.135  In this regard, as Selznick noted, an 
organizational goal can be an “ideological weapon” with which to defy 
opposition and mobilize support from the environment.136 
Yet as an IO achieves its identity through dynamic (historical) 
development, it also alters, or at least fine tunes, the original objective and 
purpose, as adolescents depart from the earlier deep identifications with 
their parents.  In other words, organizational goals must be adjustable for 
 
129 See HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 254 (1979); see also Matthias 
Finger & Bérangère Ruchat, The Transformation of International Public Organizations: The Case of 
UNCTAD 3 (IDHEAP, Working Paper No. 14, 2000) (discussing “organizational transformation” 
which an IO experiences in order to “bring organizational structure, culture, and purpose in line with 
perceived environmental requirements”). 
130 See Yash P. Gupta & David C.W. Chin, Organizational Life Cycle: A Review and Proposed 
Directions for Research, 30 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 15 (1994). 
131 Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623, 625 (2006) 
(stating that “due to its dependence on and interaction with the broader international legal system, it is 
not possible to analyze the WTO constitution fully without analyzing the broader structure”). 
132 See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 246. 
133 See Keohane, supra note 13, at 382 (observing that “institutions do not merely reflect the 
preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those 
preferences and that power” and that “institutions are therefore constitutive of actors as well as vice 
versa”) (emphasis added). 
134 See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). 
135 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 127, art. 31. 
136 PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL 
ORGANIZATION (1949); SCOTT, supra note 79, at 292. 
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organizations to survive. 137   Empirical confirmations for this goal 
dynamism are seen in the phenomena of “mission creep” of major 
international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank.138  For 
example, an internal teleological interpretation has modified the identity of 
World Bank from a narrow development organization as stipulated in 
Article 1 of its charter (Articles of Agreement), which would more or less 
tackle members’ economic well-being calculated by per capita income, to a 
more broadly mandated organization that now addresses comprehensive 
sociocultural issues, such as women’s rights, the environment, education, 
and health.139 
If organizational goals are a subjective dimension of recurring theme 
in an IO’s identity crisis, its technology is an objective one.  An IO’s 
technology refers to its functional capability to perform in order to achieve 
its goals. 140   It delineates its domain, and eventually its identity, by 
determining what kinds of products or services it may provide for whom.141  
For example, the IMF’s identity as a financial organization is inextricably 
linked to the fact that it is capable of monitoring and regulating 
international financial flows.  The identity of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as a health organization is also connected inseparably 
to the fact that it can monitor and regulate health related matters, such as 
the distribution of flu vaccines.  The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA)’s identity as a nuclear energy organization hinges on the fact that it 
can monitor and regulate nuclear energy issues, such as peaceful use of 
atomic energy. 
Yet as an open system, an organization can also import technology 
from its environment.142  Experiencing the identity crisis as it interacts with 
the environment, an organization can change the core technology by 
modifying its software (skills and other social knowledge), “humanware” 
(personnel and bureaucrats), and hardware (infrastructure and sub-
organizations).143  Organizational theories characterize this transformative 
 
137 See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 264; Gouldner, supra note 79, at 404–05. 
138 See, e.g., Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, 80 FOREIGN AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2001) 
(arguing that World Bank member countries should control the currently unwieldy status of mission 
creep by devolving some of the World Bank’s derivative missions to other institutions and focus more 
on its original, basic mission); Sarah Babb & Ariel Buira, Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion 
in Sociological Perspective: The Case of IMF Conditionality (2004) (discussing the IMF’s expanded 
mandate over the years). 
139 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations: The Case of 
the World Bank, 2 J. HIS. INT’L L. 217, 249 (2000); Georg Ress, The Interpretation of the Charter, THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 28 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (discussing 
“evolutionary dynamic interpretation”). 
140 See SCOTT, supra note 79. 
141 See id. at 126; Sol Levine & Paul White, Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of 
Interorganizational Relationships, 5 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1961); Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 256. 
142 See SCOTT, supra note 79, at 23. 
143 See Ness & Brechin, supra note 15, at 256. 
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process of acquiring and embracing new technologies as “organizational 
learning.”144  Organizational learning is a purposeful behavior to increase 
IOs’ problem solving (functional) capacities in order to achieve certain 
institutional goals and therefore plays a critical role in shaping 
organizational identities. 
 
3.  The Failure of Identity Formation 
 
If an IO cannot survive its identity crisis, it fails to achieve its true 
identity. First, in the face of challenges by the changing environment, it 
may still remain attached to an old identification prescribed by its creators, 
i.e., states.  This unresponsiveness to the environment, which may be 
equivalent to “foreclosure” in human psychology, eventually leads to 
“inefficient, self-defeating behavior.”145 
Second, if an IO is confused by multiple identifications and fails to 
commit itself to one coherent identity, its identity is diffused (“identity 
diffusion”).  Identity diffusion, like foreclosure, is a pathological symptom.  
It gravely reduces the output level of an IO.  IOs may even cease to exist 
due to these pathologies.146 
 
D.  Summary 
 
This part first introduces Erik Erikson’s identity theory that explains a 
human being’s identity formation from a psycho-social perspective.  To the 
extent that an organic entity, be it a corporation or an IO, develops as it 
continuously interacts with its environment, we could draw on Erikson’s 
identity theory.  This part draws on the recent literature on the corporate 
identity to demonstrate that scholars of business administration have 
already employed such a psychological approach in the studies of a 
corporation’s life cycle. 
Against this backdrop, the part theorizes an IO’s identity formation.  
At an early stage, an IO, as does an infant, identifies its goal with its 
founders (states).  Subsequently, however, an IO faces a moment of crisis 
as its original goal proves to be inadequate given new challenges from the 
environment.  In response, norm oriented, teleological discourses within an 
IO adjust or modify its original goal in a way that addresses those 
 
144 See Bernd Siebenhüner, International Organisations as Learning Agents in the Emerging 
System of Global Governance. A Conceptual Framework, at 16–17 (Global Governance Project, 
Working Paper No. 8, 2003), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP8.pdf. 
145 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 722–24 (discussing “insulation” as one of IOs’ 
pathologies). 
146 See Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental 
Organizations, 1981–1992, 50 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (1996) (observing that IOs “do have a mortality 
rate, and it can be surprisingly high”). 
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environmental challenges.  Through this turbulent process (identity crisis) 
emerges an IO’s collective identity, which is distinguishable from its 
members’ individual identities. 
The next part applies this IO identity formation theory to the WTO to 
better understand its historical development as an organization. 
 
IV.  A CASE STUDY: THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
 
The previous part presents a theory of identity formation of an IO 
drawing from Erik Erikson’s identity theory.  This part applies it to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  In its inception, the GATT, the WTO’s 
predecessor, was created to fight against protectionism that had wreaked 
havoc on the world economy in the interwar period.  It had started as a 
contract among a handful of states, with a strong leadership from the 
United States.  Its framers had wanted the GATT to remain basically as a 
vehicle to coordinate tariff reduction negotiations and monitor protectionist 
policies.  Thus, in early days the GATT could be identified with this rather 
functional arrangement under which state-oriented diplomacy prevailed 
over legal discourse.  Trade liberalization characterized its identity. 
However, the GATT’s original pro-trade bias began to encounter 
enormous pressure from its environment as concerns for social hygiene 
increased all across the world in the Eighties.  Outside criticisms of the 
GATT’s original goal, and its identity, prompted the GATT to embrace a 
more mature teleology that can reconcile trade and nontrade (regulatory) 
value.  In other words, the GATT underwent an identity crisis as it was 
forced to rethink its original pro-trade goal and transform itself into a new 
organization with a more balanced, integrationist identity, i.e., the WTO. 
This part envisions an optimal path for the WTO’s development, 
which embodies a normatively ideal manifestation of the WTO’s identity.  
It might be analogous to a psychologically sound state of identity formation 
in a human being.  To the WTO, it represents an institutional balance 
between traditional trade values and these nontrade values. 
 
A.  Identity Formation: An Early Stage 
 
As one of the many chapters of a much more ambitious yet eventually 
aborted project of the International Trade Organization (ITO), GATT was 
originally more of a contractual document than an organization.  In fact, 
GATT participants were named contracting parties, not members.  They 
created the GATT against the background of mutually destructive 
protectionist trade policies in the interwar period, which had diminished 
world trade by seventy percent and thus contributed to the outbreak of 
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World War II.147  Drawing on this bitter historical lesson, contracting 
parties aimed to dismantle trade barriers, mostly tariffs, by holding regular 
trade talks in a series of negotiation rounds provided by GATT. 
Therefore, GATT’s early identity as a tariff reduction arrangement can 
be said to have been identified with its creators, as children often identify 
their life goals with those of their parents.  On the other hand, GATT’s 
early identification with a strong pro-trade bias was a logical conclusion 
from the relative lack of its organizational autonomy.  After all, the GATT 
was an instrument (contract) created by a handful of states (contracting 
parties). 
Notably, GATT’s functional nature, in its early days, is evidenced by 
the relics of private contract law embedded in old GATT jurisprudence.  
Since trade negotiation was basically a reciprocal exercise, contracting 
parties had to preserve the hard won delicate balance of concessions that 
each negotiation had produced.  They had to maintain the values of those 
concessions by prohibiting parties from introducing any measures that 
might neutralize them later.  Such cheating had to be condemned, and 
remedies instituted to restore the balance of concessions.  As a 
contractarian tool, GATT was identified with its creators’ intention to 
preserve original terms of reciprocal bargains. 
Given this history, GATT’s earlier, remedial prototype was 
“nullification or impairment,” which is close to the notion of injuries in 
contract law.  Regardless of whether the measure in question is consistent 
with GATT norms, any injuries to a contracting party, namely the dilution 
of benefits of its concession should be remedied to preserve the balance of 
concessions made in the previous negotiation.148  In practice, these injuries 
meant actual adverse commercial effects to the complainant exporting 
country, such as the loss of exports, which the defendant importing 
country’s measure caused.149 
 
B.  Identity Formation: An Identity Crisis 
 
As the environment surrounding GATT began to change dramatically in 
the 1980s, the GATT’s early identity of a pro-trade bias came under attack.  
The rising ethos of the welfare state urged governments to improve social 
 
147 See Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from 
the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE UNITED STATES AND 
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003) (quoting remarks by former 
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on U.S. trade policy and the WTO on March 2, 2000). 
148 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 
763, 766–67 (2004) (discussing the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system’s institutional evolution 
from a negotiated contract to a legalized regime). 
149 See, e.g., Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, ¶ 17, 20 (Oct. 23, 
1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60 (1959). 
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hygiene in the areas of environment and human health.  The problem, 
however, was that the proliferation of these social regulations tended to 
potentially undermine the GATT’s early goal of trade liberalization.  
Diverging domestic regulations in different countries became increasingly 
trade restrictive in times of growing interdependence.150  Under certain 
circumstances, these new domestic regulations, such as nontariff barriers 
(NTBs), could be abused as a disguised form of protectionism.151 
GATT first resisted the rising tide of reregulation by striking down 
these regulations as simply trade restrictive.  Although there existed the 
General Exception Clause, GATT Article XX, under which these 
regulations might be justified, not a single measure was ever actually saved 
under the clause in the GATT’s history.152  For example, in 1990, a GATT 
panel struck down the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes as an unnecessary 
trade restriction.153  In that case, the Thai government tried to protect its 
people from a number of identifiable harms from chemicals and toxins 
contained in foreign cigarettes by banning those products.  In fact, the 
WHO endorsed the ban.  However, the panel ruled that the ban was an 
unjustifiable violation of the GATT rules because the Thai government 
could have found less trade-restrictive means than the ban, such as the 
“strict, nondiscriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure 
 
150 A number of scholars have already paid attention to this phenomenon.  For instance, Sol 
Picciotto observed that “[r]egulatory regimes have been brought into greater interaction as the removal 
of direct barriers to the flows of goods and money between states (tariffs, quotas and exchange controls) 
has shifted attention towards regulatory difference as a barrier to entry of commodities or capital.”  Sol 
Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction Between Jurisdictions and the Construction of 
Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89 (William Bratton et 
al. eds., 1996).  Likewise, some economists have also noted that: 
 
As globalization proceeds, however, it has become increasingly evident that one nation’s 
economic policies can affect other countries.  When nations were separated by high trade 
barriers and trade flows were limited, one country could ignore another nation’s 
domestic economic policies.  As barriers have come down, other countries’ domestic 
policies have become much more important. 
 
GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 89 (Gary Burtless et al eds., 1998); see also 
Aaditya Mattoo, Discriminatory Consequences of Non-Discriminatory Standards (WTO, Working 
Paper No. TISD-96-01, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/tisd9601_e.htm. 
151 See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic 
Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 643–44 (2005). 
152 See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface Between International Trade Law and the 
Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the 
United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 142 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000). 
153 Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. (Oct. 5, 1990), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/90cigart.pdf. 
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regulations.”154  This ruling was severely criticized, not only because it 
ignored the WHO’s opinion, but also because its prescription to the Thai 
government (i.e., labeling and disclosure regulations) was both 
unaffordable and ineffective for developing countries like Thailand at that 
time.155 
Therefore, while a pro-trade bias was faithful to GATT’s 
identification as a trade agreement, this bias continuously invited criticism 
from its environment, in particular civil society and environmental 
organizations.  These conflicts between GATT’s adherence to the old pro-
trade bias and pro-regulation pressure from the environment provided 
GATT with a perfect moment of identity crisis. 
GATT’s efforts to fix this bias and achieve a more mature identity 
gathered critical momentum in the launch of the WTO.  The WTO’s 
mission statement, contained in the preamble of its charter, spotlights 
“sustainable development.”  It has become obvious that due consideration 
and investment for nontrade values, such as the environment and human 
health, should be made within the WTO to achieve any development that is 
sustainable.  One can understand the creation of the Trade and 
Environment Committee, as well as special side agreements like the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), as the WTO’s effort to grow 
out of the pro-trade bias and form a more mature and responsive identity.156 
The aforementioned identity formation through the GATT era and the 
launch of the WTO corresponded with the establishment of the WTO’s 
organizational autonomy.  Importantly, its autonomy was not simply thrust 
upon the WTO with its creation.  The seed for autonomy had already been 
sown even under the GATT era in its institutional evolution.  In its later 
days, the GATT began to focus more on the public law aspect of its 
member states, such as the stability and predictability of the rule of law.  
The GATT slowly evolved into “something greater than a contract” that its 
contracting parties would not easily terminate even if its obligations 
become too burdensome.157 
In the same vein, the once critical notion of nullification or impairment 
was weakened because it was assumed away whenever a panel found a 
 
154 Id. ¶ 77. 
155 See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in 
the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 200–01 (1999) (criticizing the Thai Cigarette 
panel’s interpretation of “necessary to protect human health”). 
156 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA 
OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003); see also Veijo Heiskanen, The Regulatory Philosophy of 
International Trade, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2004). 
157 Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 135, 137 (2002). 
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violation.158  In fact, any violation would ipso facto constitute a nullification 
or impairment.159  This paradigm shift, from a power-oriented structure 
focusing on the outcome of negotiation to a rule-oriented structure valuing 
the legal system within GATT, paved the ground for a critical 
transformation from a mere contract to an independent organization.160 
 
C.  The Failure of Identity Formation 
 
As with human development, the WTO may also encounter a failed 
moment of identity formation, such as identity diffusion and foreclosure.  
In the former situation, the WTO’s core identity, namely trade, is lost, 
while in the latter situation, the WTO becomes irrelevant and unsustainable 
due to its pro-trade bias. 
Those who advocate a formal or hard linkage between trade and social 
values tend to argue that certain “social clauses,” which include fundamental 
workers’ rights or minimum international labor standards, should be 
normatively incorporated into the WTO system.161  Under this position, rich 
WTO members may restrict imports from other poorer members if the 
latter’s social conditions or practices violate these social standards.  Despite 
their ostensible moralistic streaks, these debates on hard linkage are in fact 
testimonial to the WTO’s identity crisis.  The WTO is continuously receiving 
demands for these regulatory roles and is thus exposed to different role 
identifications—with labor or environmental organizations—beyond its base 
trade organization identity.  Perhaps the WTO might be a victim of its own 
success.  The unprecedented success of the WTO, particularly in regards to 
its dispute settlement mechanism, tends to make many social issues gravitate 
towards this trade organization.162  This gravitational force presses the WTO 
 
158 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, L/4907 
(Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980). 
159 See Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175 
(June 5, 1987) (adopted June 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, §§ 5.1.3–5.1.12 (1988). 
160 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109–11 (2d ed. 1997); see also Anne O. 
Krueger, Introduction, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 2 (1998).  But see Lisa L. 
Martin & Judith Goldstein, Legalization, Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary 
Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000). 
161 See, e.g., Virginia A. Leary, Workers’ Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause 
(GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 177, 223 (Jagdish Bhagwati 
& Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Dani Rodrik, Developing Countries After the Uruguay Round (Ctr. for 
Econ. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 1084, 1994) (proposing a “social safeguards” clause based on 
core labor rights in the WTO). 
162 See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 30 
(2002); Sylvia Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
MILLENNIUM ROUND: FREER TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 285, 290, 293 (Klaus Günter 
Deutsch & Bernhard Speyer eds., 2001); José E. Alvarez, How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums 
of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 15 (2001). 
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to agonize over diverse role expectations.163 
Critically, however, such hard linkage risks undermining one of the 
WTO’s core values—free trade.164  If the WTO authorizes members to 
freely restrict imports from other members that allegedly violate those 
social standards, the WTO’s old identity as a trade organization would be 
severely undermined since it would fail to uphold trade values.  As 
discussed above,165 this symptom accounts for identity diffusion. 
In general, social standards are lower for developing countries than 
developed countries because the former countries are poorer than the 
latter.166  Without addressing this inherent developmental disparity, merely 
exerting sanctions on poor countries would never achieve a satisfactory 
level of protection for putative societal concerns.  Contrarily, such 
ventures—hard linkage—will only encroach on poor countries’ 
comparative advantages, such as cheap labor, and thus generate serious 
tensions between rich and poor countries without affecting the root cause of 
the problem.167  Rich countries may even be tempted to use these regulatory 
concerns as convenient excuses for raising trade barriers, as seen in green 
or blue protectionism.168  Then, the WTO will perform neither a trade nor a 
nontrade function, and its identity would therefore be lost. 
This risk of identity diffusion might also be found in yet another 
linkage of “trade and development.”  During its first decade, the WTO 
failed to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor.  The least-
developed countries’ marginalization from the mainstream global trading 
system and the subsequent abject poverty in these countries seriously 
questioned the rationale of the WTO.169  This development deficiency170 
drove the WTO toward yet another identification as it launched the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001.  Yet the rhetoric of a development 
 
163 Tomer Broude analyzed this problem in the area of trade and development.  See Tomer Broude, 
The Rule(s) of Trade and Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and Aspirational 
Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 221 (2006). 
164 See Kym Anderson, Environmental and Labor Standards: What Role for the WTO?, in THE 
WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 243–45 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998). 
165 See supra Parts III.A.3, III.C.3. 
166 Anderson, supra note 164, at 244. 
167 Id. 
168 See Reginald Dale, No ‘Blue-Green’ Protectionism, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-think_5.html; cf. Gregory Shaffer, 
WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment 
Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 608, 647–48 (2000) (critically observing that 
in the absence of financial assistance to poor countries any radical linkage of labor or environment to 
trade would be futile). 
169 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004). 
170 Celso L. N. Amorim, The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 95, 96–99 (2000) (discussing “development deficit” under the WTO in the areas of 
agriculture and textiles). 
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round might not fully match the technology or capacity of the WTO.171  
Nonetheless, if the WTO attempts to achieve development goals by 
affording developing countries rule exemptions in the name of “special and 
differential treatment,” it might be counterproductive, because it would 
eventually hurt development by hindering developing countries’ effort to 
get access to the world market.172 
In confronting the risk of identity diffusion, some might argue that the 
WTO should never be involved in these nontrade regulatory issues, and 
should instead focus on traditionally narrow trade issues. 173   But this 
impulsive reaction tends to usher in yet another risk of failed identity 
formation—foreclosure.  In other words, the WTO may be preoccupied by its 
own “ritualized behavior,” such as its pro-trade bias, which is completely 
unresponsive and unaccountable to larger social environment. 174   This 
insulation from its environment and refusal to process the meaningful 
information provided by its environment tend to undermine its legitimacy, 
and is thus detrimental to the organization’s survival.175 
 
D.  Towards a Balanced Identity of the WTO 
 
As is the case of a human individual, the WTO’s identity formation or 
identity achievement is inseparable from its recognition of its inevitable 
connectedness to its environment.  The WTO is an open, not a self-
contained, system.176  The WTO interacts with, responds to, and is even 
influenced by its environment.  Importantly, however, the WTO’s openness 
 
171 Broude, supra note 163.  But see Asif H. Qureshi, International Trade for Development: The 
WTO as a Development Institution?, 43 J. WORLD TRADE, 173, 187 (2009) (arguing that “the WTO has 
a function as a development institution”). 
172 J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?, in THE 
WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 365, 390 (Anne O. Krueger ed. 1998). 
173 Anderson, supra note 164, at 245. 
174 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 718; see Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—
and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94 (2002) (criticizing 
the “insider network” under the GATT/WTO system); Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and 
the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement, in 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 
334 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (critically observing that internal legitimation within the trade 
bureaucracy based on the diplomatic ethos tends to undermine the external legitimation of the 
multilateral trading system); Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal 
Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969 (2006) (contending that “the effectiveness and legitimacy of the WTO 
depend on how it relates to norms of other legal systems and on the nature and quality of its 
relationships with other international organizations”). 
175 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 29, at 722; cf. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional 
Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 2 (2003) (critically observing 
that the “inward-looking, economic” vision of the WTO could not gain broad support and thus should be 
replaced by the “external, participatory” vision aligned with pluralistic, democratic decision-making). 
176 See Lamy, supra note 174, at 969 (observing that “the WTO is well aware of the existence of 
other systems of norms and of the fact that it is not acting alone in the international sphere”). 
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does not deprive itself of an “autopoietic” nature as an organization that 
preserves its operative integrity.177  The status quo of the WTO in terms of 
its capacity (technology) and resources, which are the very product of its 
institutional development, stipulates its central identity as a trade 
organization.  As of now, the WTO cannot, and should not, become a 
human rights organization or an environmental organization.  The WTO 
may accommodate these nontrade values in various ways by voluntarily 
adjusting its own internal legal and institutional choices in the course of its 
evolution.178  Yet these nontrade values must not be imposed on the WTO 
externally, as they force the WTO to accept norms and consequences 
inconsistent with its current identity.179 
Therefore, a desirable form of identity formation for the WTO will be 
to attain an institutional balance between trade and nontrade, or social, 
regulatory values without losing its character as a trade organization.  This 
balance means reconciliation between trade and social values from the 
WTO’s perspective as a trade organization.  This reconciliation should be 
based on the WTO’s institutional capacity, its core technology, and its own 
path dependency.  In symbolic rhetoric, the agenda should be “trade and 
labor or environment” not “labor or environment and trade.”  The WTO’s 
core technology, such as its software (jurisprudence) and hardware 
(committees), is capable of performing such reconciliation. 
 Via its constructive (teleological) interpretation, the WTO tribunal 
can harmonize trade and social values without losing the WTO’s main 
character.  In paradigmatic cases such as Gasoline (1996)180 and Shrimp-
Turtle (1998),181 the WTO tribunal bestowed on domestic regulators broad 
discretion in establishing the content of domestic regulations, while it 
focused only on the manner in which they were applied.182  Under this case 
law, WTO members can freely pursue their non-trade or social policy 
objectives as long as they adhere to certain basic procedural disciplines, 
such as good faith and due process.  This hermeneutics is teleological in the 
sense that it was driven by the WTO’s new telos, “sustainable 
development,” which is nothing but the WTO’s new commitment to a more 
balanced organizational identity than the old GATT. 
Therefore, these rulings represent a mature departure from GATT’s 
narrow identification with a pro-trade bias, which, if left unchecked, would 
 
177 Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction to NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 
8 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., 2004). 
178 Id. 
179 See generally Sungjoon Cho, WTO’s Identity Crisis, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 298 (2006). 
180 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
181 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. 
182 Id. ¶¶ 146–86 (regarding the so-called “chapeau test”); see also CHO, supra note 156, at 45–62. 
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have led to foreclosure as a failure of identity formation.  In these cases, the 
WTO no longer dismissed social values in a blind pursuit of trade values, 
as it did in Thai Cigarette.  For example, in Shrimp-Turtle, the WTO 
tribunal referred to non-trade, environmental conventions, such as the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), in a serious effort to locate common ground between 
the WTO and those environmental treaties.183 
Another way of embracing social values within the WTO without 
diffusing its identity is to pursue quasi-harmonization through international 
regulatory standards.  Any hard regulatory bargaining within the WTO that 
aims for a single undertaking would be infeasible simply due to the WTO’s 
lack of core technology in these regulatory areas, as well as the politically 
combustible nature of those target regulations.184  A more realistic way is to 
utilize the WTO’s pre-existing hardware, such as the Trade and 
Environment Committee and the SPS Committee, to encourage WTO 
members to tap into relevant international regulatory standards.185  These 
committees, if well operated, can contribute greatly to regulatory dialogue 
among WTO members and effectively address the subtle interface between 
trade and regulatory issues.  At the same time, in these committee activities 
the WTO can co-opt relevant international regulatory organizations, such as 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
Finally, this reconciliation may also be manifested as coherence in 
policy making between the WTO and other relevant IOs.  For example, the 
World Bank can help the WTO finance technical assistance projects, such 
as the training of government officials, to build the regulatory capacity of 
developing countries.186  The WTO and other IOs can also perform a joint 
study that identifies areas of common concerns and interests.  The recent 
WTO-ILO joint study, “Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy 
Research,” offers a good example in this regard.187  By identifying common 
interests and concerns of both organizations, as well as defining a 
relationship between trade and employment, this type of joint study 
provides a fertile ground for policy coherence between trade and non-trade 
values.  Under this nuanced approach, the WTO can maintain fidelity to its 
identity as a trade organization while still responding to its increasingly 
demanding environment. 
 
183 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 181, ¶¶ 130, 132. 
184 But see Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 307–
08 (2004) (arguing for a grand regulatory bargaining within the WTO). 
185 See Cho, supra note 151. 
186 See Gary P. Sampson, Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking: A WTO Perspective, 
in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 257, 265 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998). 
187 WTO & ILO, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH (2007). 
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E.  Summary 
 
This part applies the theory of an IO’s identity formation developed in 
the previous part to the WTO.  In the early days, the GATT identified with 
its founding nations that were preoccupied with the elimination of trade 
barriers, mostly tariffs.  Its organizational autonomy was nearly nonexistent 
as the GATT was a mere tool for those founding nations to achieve a 
functional need⎯trade liberalization. 
However, as the regulatory environment changed, GATT’s pro-trade 
identity was under attack and it was forced to rethink its original identity. 
GATT, and subsequently the WTO, underwent this identity crisis as it 
came to terms with its environment, in particular the regulatory world. 
From a normative perspective, the WTO’s ideal manifestation of its 
identity formation is an ongoing process.  It should continuously maintain a 
balanced identity between trade and non-trade values in its diurnal 
operation.  Many avenues within the WTO system, ranging from 
adjudication to peer review, can help attain this normative goal. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article argues that an IO, like a human being, is prone to the 
process of identity formation in establishing its autonomy from its member 
states.  As an IO undergoes various institutional changes, its old 
identification with an original goal may encounter a new identification with 
another purpose, and thus it may experience confusion regarding its true 
identity (identity crisis).  But an IO can achieve a coherent institutional self 
by striking a balance between these multiple identifications under the 
constraints that various parameters, such as its environment and its 
technology, impose.  Yet an IO may also fail to achieve its identity by 
insulating itself from its environment (foreclosure) or being adrift in the 
middle of these multiple identifications without making any commitment to 
a final identity (identity diffusion). 
This identity theory of IOs may find in the WTO its major empirical 
confirmation.  As an organic institution that incessantly interacts with its 
environment, the WTO has evolved from the early GATT, which was 
defined largely by a pro-trade character, to the WTO, whose identity 
formation has been influenced by a strong external demand for a new 
identification with nontrade (societal) values, such as protection of the 
environment and human health.  From a normative perspective, the WTO’s 
identity formation is to strike an institutional balance between traditional 
trade values and these nontrade values.  It is an ongoing process that 
reveals itself in the WTO’s daily operation—adjudication or peer review. 
Finally, this Article addresses the external or macro social dynamics 
of an autonomous entity itself.  It explores how a self-organizing entity 
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forms its organizational identity by incessantly interacting with its 
environment.  It also anthropomorphizes such an entity by analogizing its 
organizational development to that of a human.  Yet, this Article leaves the 
social dynamics within an organization largely unexplained.  Other 
scholars may explore how individual members of an organization, such as a 
state or a company, form a collective identity among them.  They may 
focus on internal, micro dynamics among individual actors leading 
eventually to the formation of a corporate identity.188 
 
 
188 See International State, supra note 71. 
